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OnQ Diligence Request

Questions for Paul Chapuis · Prepared for A Level Alliances by Value Masters Academy · 19 October 2026

These are the questions I would be working through if I were sitting in the data room myself. They fall into three parts: what we need from Northern Edge about the process, what we need from OnQ about the business, and the financial and balance-sheet schedules any funding partner will require before a dollar moves. Not one of them is a challenge to the company. Every one is a figure I will be asked for, and I would rather bring the answer than the question.

A correction worth reading first

Our working note had RCS Innovations being sold between June and August 2026. That is wrong, and the real outcome is far more useful to us than the one we assumed. RCS was split: the commercial interiors division was bought as a going concern, and the retail display division was liquidated at auction in December 2025. The full note is at the end of this document. It changes how I read the three bids on your table, and it strengthens the case for the structure rather than weakening it.

Section 0

Where the process stands, and how I read it

What we understand today: three bidders have indicated in the $25M to $35M range; a third participant, Modern Space, entered the data room in June and has not moved since; and you have said you are disappointed in the outcome. Before anyone draws a conclusion from that, four observations.

Three bidders at the end of a funnel is not a failed process. In a lower-middle-market sale the usual shape is 100 to 250 companies contacted, a quarter to a third signing confidentiality agreements, ten to twenty indications of interest, five to ten into the data room, and three to six letters of intent. Three at the table is the normal end of that funnel. It is a failure only if the top of the funnel was narrow, and we cannot tell the difference from here. That is what Part A asks for.

The convergence of the three bids argues for the banker, not against. A weak process produces no bids, or wildly dispersed ones. Three independent parties landing inside a $10M band is a market speaking with one voice.

The gap is probably in the denominator. Buyers underwrite reviewed history, not a projection. Against 2025 actual adjusted EBITDA of $3.5M, bids of $25M to $35M are roughly seven to ten times. Against the 2026P figure of $5.9M they are four to six times. Both readings are defensible and they produce very different feelings about the same number. Part B exists to close that gap with contracted order data, because contracted forward revenue is the only thing that moves a buyer off trailing earnings.

Where the process is genuinely open to question is discipline, not count. A competitor sitting in the data room since June with no enforced bid deadline is a process-management issue regardless of how many bids arrived. So is the question of what was released to whom, and when.

One structural note, offered as context rather than criticism. Northern Edge presents itself as a generalist North American sell-side boutique, and the transactions it displays are domestic industrial and business services. OnQ's most logical acquirers are Asian and European strategics and retail-technology sponsors. If the outreach did not reach that universe, the three bids may be telling us about the universe contacted rather than about the company. That universe is what I bring, and it is the one argument for a price above the current band.

Part A

What we need from Northern Edge

These are standard seller entitlements under a sell-side mandate. Asking for them is not a complaint about the banker; it is how you find out whether to be disappointed.

A1The outreach funnel, in four numbers First wave

How many companies were contacted; how many signed confidentiality agreements; how many indications of interest were received; how many entered the data room. Plus the split: how many were international, and how many financial sponsors versus strategics. These four numbers decide whether three bidders is a normal outcome or a narrow one.

A2The buyer log First wave

The named list of parties contacted, with status against each. If the Asian and European strategic universe and the retail-technology sponsors were not approached, that is worth knowing before anyone concludes the company is worth $30M.

A3Was there a bid deadline, and was it enforced?

A process without an announced and enforced bid date creates no pressure on bidders, and a bidder with no deadline has every reason to sit still.

A4What was staged, and what was open from day one?

Standard practice is that the patent schedule, the customer contracts and detailed unit economics are released only past a letter of intent, not to anyone who signs a confidentiality agreement. Which of OnQ's materials sat behind which gate?

A5The data room access logs, per user and per document First wave

Every virtual data room records who opened and downloaded what, and when. This is the answer to the Modern Space question, and it is documentary rather than inferential. A party that pulled the intellectual property schedule, the patent list and the customer contracts but never opened the financial statements was doing something other than preparing a bid.

A6The confidentiality agreements as signed by competitors

Specifically whether each contains a standstill, a non-solicitation of employees and customers, and a non-use clause, and what the survival period is. Also how many direct competitors signed at all.

A7The structure of the three indications, not just the headline

Cash at closing versus earnout versus seller note; financing contingencies; the working capital peg; which liabilities are assumed and which excluded. A $35M headline with half in earnout is not a $35M offer, and a $25M all-cash offer with no contingency may be the better one.

Part B

Revenue, backlog and forward visibility

Q1Three years of orders against three years of deliveries, by customer and by year

Orders booked and deliveries actually completed, in units and in dollars, by retailer and by brand, for 2023, 2024 and 2025 plus 2026 to date. Per customer and year: orders booked, delivered, open at year end, cancelled or deferred, and average order value.

Why this matters more than any other question: 2024 revenue of $32.4M against 2022's $47.9M is a 32% drawdown, and 2025 recovered to $49.0M. A buyer reads that as volatility. An order-versus-delivery table tells us whether 2024 was demand loss, programme timing, or deliveries slipping across a year end. Those are three different companies, and they are worth three different prices.

Q2The same picture forward, in three tiers First wave

This is the single most valuable document in the sale, and I suspect it does not yet exist in this form.

TierDefinitionWhat we need
ContractedSigned purchase orders or committed programme awardsUnits, dollars, brand, retailer, delivery window
AssumedInstalled programmes with an established refresh rhythm but no signed orderUnits, dollars, brand, the historical refresh interval it rests on
ProjectedPipeline, proposals outstanding, categories in discussionUnits, dollars, named opportunity, stage, probability

The 2026P figure of $60M revenue and $5.9M adjusted EBITDA is being read by bidders as a projection, because that is how it is presented. If a material part of it is contracted, the valuation basis moves from trailing earnings to forward, and that single reclassification is worth more than anything either of us will negotiate.

Q2bThe 54% recurring figure, broken into its parts

How much is contracted refresh, how much is repeat behaviour without a contract, how much is Converge software licensing. Recurring revenue resting on habit is worth materially less than recurring revenue resting on a contract, and bidders will assume the former unless shown otherwise.

Part C

How work is won, and what it costs to win it

Q3Walk one order end to end, then give the aggregate

Take a real programme from the last eighteen months and trace it: how the opportunity arrived, who was approached and by whom, what was submitted, how many rounds, who decided, how long from first contact to purchase order, and what was spent along the way. Then, for each of the last three years:

If I could ask only one question, this would be it. The CIM says the sales cycle inside an existing customer is one to four months and that OnQ is the only firm in the competitive matrix filling all seven capability columns. If the win rate is high and the cost per bid is low, the business has a moat and the value sits in the channel. If the win rate is modest and each bid consumes engineering time and tooling spend, a large part of gross margin is really a sales cost in the wrong line, and the true margin on won work differs from the reported one.

This also prices the Atmosphere channel. If each new programme costs a measurable amount in unrecovered bid spend, a guaranteed captive order channel removes a real, quantifiable expense from this business. That number belongs in the valuation and nobody has calculated it yet.

Part D

The installed base and what actually gets collected

Q4The service layer on the installed base, and whether any of it is contracted

OnQ systems are in more than 10,000 stores. What happens to them after installation?

The Wellness table model and the pod model both assume an annual service and software relationship with the retailer. If that relationship already exists contractually on the installed base, the forward plan extends something proven. If it does not, we are proposing a new commercial motion and should price it as one.

Q5Deductions between invoice and cash First wave

What is the gap between what OnQ invoices and what OnQ collects, and why?

This is the question that most often moves a purchase price in this sector. Big-box retailers and large brands are known for taking deductions after delivery. If reported revenue is gross of material recuts, both margin and working capital look better than the cash reality, and a buyer who finds this in confirmatory diligence will reprice late and hard. Far better that we know now and put it on the table ourselves.

Part E

Capability for the Next Gen plan

Every question here tests an assumption the leverage plan rests on. A "no" is useful. A "no" discovered in 2028 is not.

Q6Competitors in the data room

How many direct competitors signed confidentiality agreements, and is per-user, per-document access traceable? Covered operationally in A5 and A6; repeated here because it is a question about OnQ's intellectual property, not only about the process. Specifically: what could a competitor have taken away — the patent schedule, the customer contract list, programme-level margins, the supplier list, the Converge and Dfi technical documentation?

Q7Phygital Elements — how deep is the team actually

The plan assumes OnQ's design, marketing and sales organisation can carry a phygital product line. How many people, with what background, have built anything beyond a display: a connected product, a consumer-facing device, a revenue-share placement rather than a one-time sale? The CIM describes 15 people in design and engineering averaging more than 15 years of experience, which is a strong display engineering team. Is any of that experience consumer product rather than fixture?

Q8AI-driven and AI build technology — what has actually been spent

Past and projected research and development specifically on artificial intelligence: budget by year for the last three years and as planned for the next three; headcount; what was built; what is in production versus prototype. Converge and the IBM i integration at Costco are real and verifiable. Is there AI work beyond content management and inventory integration, or is "AI-driven" today a roadmap rather than a line item?

Q9Food, grocery and supermarket chains — any history at all

Has OnQ ever delivered into a grocery or supermarket chain: which retailer, what programme, what year, what outcome? Is any food or grocery work in the current pipeline or plan?

The Wellness table concept assumes a grocery category relationship. If OnQ has never sold into that channel, the two thirds of the leverage case that rests on it needs a different route in, and the pilot must come before the model, not after.

Q10Refurbishment and conversion of the installed base

Has anyone studied whether the systems already installed can be refurbished and converted into AI-build physical or experiential tables? If the study exists: results by brand and by store, conversion cost per unit, which programmes qualify, what the retailer's consent requires. If it does not exist: is it in the plan, and if not, what is the reason?

This is potentially the largest single asset in the company and the cheapest revenue in the plan, because the units, the floor space and the retailer relationship already exist.

Q11Octanorm and B+N Industries

Has OnQ worked with either, in any capacity: supply, licensing, joint specification, competitive encounter? Octanorm supplies modular aluminium profile systems with a US base in Lithia Springs, Georgia. B+N Industries makes architectural wall, ceiling and display systems including batten, panel and shelving ranges with quick-ship availability. Both sit in the leverage plan as standardisation partners. Prior history, good or bad, changes how we approach them.

Q12RCS, and whether it was used

RCS Innovations was second on our own US retail fixture shortlist. Did Northern Edge raise what happened to RCS, in either direction? If so, was a comparable company's outcome — price, buyer, or the absence of both — used as a reference point in positioning OnQ? See the case study below. The outcome is not what we assumed, and it is the strongest single piece of evidence available to us.

Q13The key-person question, which nobody has asked First wave

What, precisely, in the customer relationships is personal to you, and what is institutional? Named relationship owner by account; who else at OnQ has a direct line to each category buyer; which retailer or brand relationships would require reintroduction if you were not there; what happens to the Next Generation programme selection if you step back.

This is uncomfortable and it is unavoidable. In the structure as planned you move to the alliance side and I take the manufacturing side. A funding partner will ask what remains of the channel once the person who built it has moved. The RCS case below shows exactly how fast a fixture business can unravel when a key person leaves the building. I would rather answer this with an org chart than with reassurance.

Part F

Financial and balance-sheet schedules

Nothing above touches the financial statements, which is a gap in our own list. These are the schedules a lender or equity partner will require in confirmatory diligence. Most exist already in the accounting system; the work is extraction, not analysis. Figures in US dollars; monthly where available, otherwise quarterly, for FY2023, FY2024, FY2025 and FY2026 to date.

F1Supplier schedule, three years

The CIM shows two Chinese suppliers at roughly 11.4% and 6.6% of FY25 purchasing, about $4.1M combined, and a Mexican near-shore supplier qualified in 2023. The supply leverage in the plan is built on redirecting that spend, and it cannot be sized without the line items. The tooling question decides whether a supplier switch is a negotiation or a re-engineering project.

F2Cost of goods breakdown on the three largest delivered programmes First wave

This is the schedule that converts the four-point cost-of-goods thesis from an assertion into a number. Without it the supply leverage stays an opinion. The quoted-versus-delivered margin variance is also the single best indicator of estimating discipline, which is what a manufacturing buyer pays for.

F3Operating expense detail and management fees

F4Compensation schedule

F5Debt, obligations and contingent liabilities

F6Leases and leasing

The Akron renewal falls inside the investment period. Renewal rent on 278,000 square feet is a material unknown, and the second-shift capacity thesis assumes a facility cost that has not been fixed.

F7Fixed assets and equipment

The RCS case below makes this schedule unusually important: it is the only part of this business for which we have an observed market clearing price, and that price was set one auction lot at a time.

F8Quality of earnings — the adjustment bridge First wave

The 2026P figure of $5.9M adjusted EBITDA is the number the whole valuation rests on, and "adjusted" is doing unknown work in it. This is the first thing a lender's accountant will rebuild.

F9Working capital and the cash conversion cycle

A programme manufacturer funds material and labour before it invoices. The peak intra-year requirement, not the year-end balance, is what a buyer must finance, and it is invisible in annual statements.

F10Capital expenditure history and maintenance requirement

F11Related-party transactions First wave

You are both the seller of OnQ and a 40% owner and manager of A Level Alliances, which would become OnQ's largest prospective customer. I am treating this as a related-party transaction and disclosing it on page one rather than leaving it for diligence to find. This schedule is how that disclosure is evidenced.

F12Tax, duties and tariffs

Tariffs cut 2025 gross margin to 37.7%. The duty paid by origin, by year, is what tells us how much of the supply leverage is tariff arbitrage and how much is genuine cost improvement — which matters, because tariff arbitrage can be legislated away.

F13Insurance, litigation and warranty

F14Intellectual property ownership chain First wave

Converge and Dfi are where the value is. If the patents sit in an affiliate, or if a contractor never signed an assignment, the thing being bought is not the thing in the memorandum. The RCS outcome below is what a fixture business is worth without defensible intellectual property.

F15Customer contracts and change of control First wave

If the largest customer can terminate at will on a change of control, the channel is not an asset that transfers, and the price has to reflect that. This is also the answer to verification items 2 and 3 in the leverage plan, which together carry two thirds of the asymmetry.

F16Inventory

F17People, capacity and the second shift

F18Monthly financials and reporting

Everything above is faster to answer with system access than with prepared schedules. If read-only access can be granted under the confidentiality agreement, most of Part F answers itself.

Case study

RCS Innovations — the market split the company in two

Footnote to Q12. Compiled from open sources; not verified against any private record.

RCS Innovations of Milwaukee, founded 1979, ran two divisions: RCS Commercial Interiors and RCS Retail Solutions. Its clients ranged from local businesses to Harley-Davidson. In November 2025 it was reported to be closing and liquidating its assets. What actually happened is more precise than that, and more useful.

The commercial interiors division was sold as a going concern. JL Business Interiors, a family-owned firm in West Bend, Wisconsin, with more than thirty years of local trading, bought RCS Commercial Interiors. Its chief executive described the purchase as growth in the right direction during a difficult year for his own company, following the death of its founder and of its lead installer of nearly 28 years. The rcsinnovations.com domain today carries a single banner pointing to the acquirer.

The retail display division was liquidated. MachineryMax ran a complete shop closure auction of more than 500 lots at 7075 W. Parkland Ct., Milwaukee — late-model Biesse computer-controlled machining centres, panel processing, material handling and plant support equipment — with inspection on 2 and 3 December 2025 and bidding closing on 4 December. No buyer was named and no reason for the closure was published.

The timing in our working note was also wrong: this was late 2025, not June to August 2026. If RCS still sat second on our US retail fixture shortlist, that shortlist was compiled before the closure or was not refreshed after it. The same list placed Modern Space ninth.

What it tells us

The market bought the recurring service book and refused the project manufacturing. The division with local relationships, repeat work and installation service found a buyer. The division that manufactured retail display programmes on a bid-to-bid basis found none, and its machines were sold one lot at a time. That is not a comment on RCS's competence. It is a statement about what the two revenue models are worth, and it is the same line that runs through the middle of OnQ.

It is the argument for the operating-company structure, not against it. What killed RCS Retail Solutions is precisely the condition the plan is designed to remove: one-time revenue, a single customer type, no contracted recurring book, and a plant whose only work came from winning the next bid. Separating manufacturing into a contracted operating company with a fixed first-year budget, exclusive supply on new products and its own third-party customers is the direct answer to that failure mode. The case study is the evidence for the structure.

It tells us what the plant is worth, which is why none of the price can rest on it. A forty-six-year-old fixture manufacturer with modern Biesse equipment did not find a going-concern buyer for that business. Against that, three live bidders at $25M to $35M is a functioning market, and it is paying for Converge, for the roughly 50 Dfi patents, for on-time-in-full above 99% and for the position inside the largest customer's electronics category. The Akron facility is where that value is delivered, not where it lives. This is the argument for the price, and equally the argument against selling the company to a buyer who wants only the plant.

It raises the key-person question, which is why Q13 exists. The surviving half of this story turns on individuals: a founder's death and a lead installer of nearly three decades, at a company small enough that both mattered to its direction. OnQ is larger, but the channel position described in the memorandum is substantially one person's relationships. In the structure as planned, that person moves to the other side of the table. A funding partner will ask what remains. We should have the answer first.

And it sharpens the Modern Space question. In a sector where a capable manufacturer can fail to find a buyer for its manufacturing business, the intellectual property and the channel relationships are the whole prize. A competitor's access to the data room is therefore more serious here than it would be in most industries, which is why A5 asks for the logs.

If Northern Edge did not use the RCS outcome in positioning OnQ, that is a missed argument. The split between what sold and what did not is the clearest available evidence that OnQ is a different kind of company from the one its trailing multiple suggests.

Sequence

What to answer first

Twelve items carry the first wave, because each one can change the price or the structure, and the rest can wait for them:

ItemSubjectWhy first
A1, A2Outreach funnel and buyer logDecides whether three bidders is weak or normal
A5Data room access logsDocumentary, available today, settles the competitor question
Q2Contracted forward revenueThe only thing that moves valuation off trailing earnings
Q5Invoice-to-cash deductionsA buyer will find this late and reprice hard
Q13Key-person dependencyThe question a funding partner asks first and we have not asked
F2Programme-level cost of goodsConverts the cost thesis into a number
F8EBITDA adjustment bridgeThe $5.9M figure is the whole valuation
F11Related-party transactionsDisclosed by us, not discovered by them
F14Intellectual property ownership chainIf the patents sit elsewhere, the asset is not the asset
F15Customer change-of-control termsDecides whether the channel transfers at all

The remainder can be answered over two or three weeks, and several items — Q10 and Q11 in particular — may simply never have been studied. "We have not looked at that" is a complete and useful answer. For most of Part F, read-only access to the accounting system under the confidentiality agreement would be faster for everyone than preparing schedules by hand.

A note on the spirit of this list. It reads as a long set of demands and I am aware of that. It is not scepticism about the company. It is that I will be asked every one of these questions by a funding partner, and the difference between bringing answers and bringing questions is the difference between a funded structure and a polite decline.